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In his American Bar Association Journal article, The Common Law 
of Morrison County,1 John Simonett mused that Oliver Wendell 
Holmes Jr. must have had Morrison County in mind when he said 
that the life of the law has been experience rather than logic.  
Reading Justice Simonett’s opinions, you can almost see the 
Morrison County watermark.  In fact, a more tempting title for an 
essay on Justice John E. Simonett and the law of torts might be, 
“You Can Take the Judge out of Morrison County, But You Can’t 
Take Morrison County out of the Judge.” 
In his article, The Use of the Term “Result-Oriented” to Characterize 
Appellate Decisions,2 Justice Simonett explored what it means when a 
court is accused of arriving at a “result-oriented” decision.  His 
article points out that “[e]ach time judges seek to find a way to 
attain a certain result that to them seems just under the 
circumstances, they are, of course, being result-minded,” but 
 
 † Margaret H. and James E. Kelley Professor of Tort Law, William Mitchell 
College of Law. 
 1.  John E. Simonett, The Common Law of Morrison County, 49 A.B.A. J. 263 
(1963). 
 2.  John E. Simonett, The Use of the Term “Result-Oriented” to Characterize 
Appellate Decisions, 10 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 187 (1984). 
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“result-oriented” should be used pejoratively not just when there is 
disagreement with a decision, but only if the decision represents a 
departure from decision-making norms.3 
His commentary on the format and substance—the norms—of 
appellate opinions is a window to an examination of his opinions 
involving tort law and tort-related issues: 
The typical appellate opinion in its published form 
marches along in an orderly fashion, but it should come 
as no surprise that the court, consciously or 
unconsciously, may not be setting out all the factors that 
entered into its decision.  In their written opinions, judges 
are not necessarily expected to state the reasons for 
deciding as they did, but only to justify their decision with 
reasoning that is respectable and authorities that are 
appropriate. 
       The published opinion may march inexorably 
forward step-by-step toward a conclusion, but it is unlikely 
that the judge’s mental processes proceeded in that 
manner.  Rather than to march forward, it is likely that 
the human mind (to switch metaphors) tends to hover, 
until finally, it alights on a conclusion.  “General 
propositions do not decide concrete cases,” said Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, adding, “[t]he decision will 
depend on a judgment or intuition more subtle than any 
articulate major premise.”  The key notion here is that of 
inarticulateness.  What may seem to be reasoning 
backwards from a desired result may be a normal process 
of reasoning from an inarticulate premise intuitively felt 
but nevertheless real and meritorious.  Even if one could 
go behind a written opinion to see how the result was 
reached, there is no certainty that one would be any the 
wiser.  So, a result-oriented decision cannot fairly be cast 
in a pejorative light merely on surmise about that which 
the court “really had in mind.”4 
Appellate courts perform dual functions of making new law and 
correcting error: 
As to the latter, the appellate court plays a limited role as 
a court of review and is expected to give due deference to 
the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law.  As 
to the former, the lawmaking role, the appellate court is 
 
 3.  Id. at 209. 
 4.  Id. at 193–94 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted). 
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expected to decide new issues in a reasoned manner, with 
respect for precedent and the judiciary’s role in a 
government of separated power, and, if established law is 
to be overruled, to do so candidly, sparingly, and for good 
cause.  For example, if judges are neither required nor 
necessarily expected to state all their reasons for deciding 
as they did, at a minimum, they are expected to justify 
their result with scrupulous handling of the facts, honest 
reasoning, and pertinent precedent.  Legitimate reasons 
for the result must be articulated even if they are not all 
the reasons and even if the true motivation for the result 
is only intuitively felt.5 
While decisions may of necessity be result-oriented, a “decision is 
bad when it gives the impression of being ad hoc justice, 
unprincipled, and dependent on the personal predilections of the 
judges.”6  Justice Simonett’s opinions most certainly never give the 
appearance of ad hoc justice; they are always principled; they do 
not appear to be based on his personal predilections.  There are 
several identifying characteristics of his opinions, as I read them. 
1. The opinions show a deep respect for the trial process and the 
role of the judge and jury in that process.  Simonett, the 
experienced trial lawyer, always seemed to be looking on.7 
 
 5.  Id. at 195–96. 
 6.  Id. at 196. 
 7.  There are many examples.  Justice Simonett’s comments on summary 
judgment practice in Lundgren v. Eustermann, 370 N.W.2d 877 (Minn. 1985), is an 
excellent one.  The case was a medical malpractice case that turned on the 
admissibility of the opinion of a licensed consulting psychologist as to whether the 
defendant family practice physician was negligent in his prescription of 
antipsychotic medication.  Justice Simonett held that it was not error for the trial 
court to consider an unsworn and untimely letter submitted by the psychologist, 
particularly since the defense attorney made only a vague objection to the letter.  
In a footnote, Justice Simonett added the following observations on making a 
record for summary judgment motions: 
We do not mean to minimize the importance of making a proper 
record for a summary judgment motion.  As Professor Moore has 
commented, in addition to the pleadings, affidavits and depositions, the 
trial court in deciding a motion may consider oral testimony, facts subject 
to judicial notice, stipulations, concessions of counsel, and any other 
material that would be admissible in evidence or otherwise usable at trial.  
6 J. Moore & J. Wicker, Federal Practice ¶ 56.15[7] (1985).  The 
informality which sometimes accompanies motion practice should not, 
however, lull counsel into taking less care in making their record for 
summary judgment than they would for a trial.  It is important, both for 
clarity and fairness, that court and counsel all know and agree on the 
contents of the record. 
Lundgren, 370 N.W.2d at 881 n.1. 
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2. His opinions are carefully structured to provide guidance in 
the form of intelligible, workable principles that judges and 
lawyers will not have to struggle to understand.  Appellate 
opinions make law, but determining how that law is translated 
for juries may often be difficult.  He would often provide 
guidance by suggesting a potential jury instruction, “along 
these lines . . . [,]” but of course leaving it up to judges and 
lawyers how best to implement the opinion.8 
3. His opinions are often didactic, but without really seeming to 
be so.  This characteristic seems to be particularly prominent 
in his concurring opinions, in which he uses to advantage the 
chance to explain some nuance of the case that was perhaps 
overlooked in the majority opinion.  This leads to a fourth and 
related point. 
4. His opinions are scholarly, although I am not sure if he would 
have liked that label, at least if the term is used pejoratively to 
describe work that judges and lawyers can’t use; but he wrote 
the same way in his law review articles as he did in his 
opinions.9  He always brings theory home.  His audience was 
the bench and bar. 
5. His opinions are relatively short, as opinions go, supported 
with appropriate authority, but not overloaded with it.10  The 
opinions get to the point quickly.  They are not overburdened 
by complicating footnotes.11 
 
 8.  See Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616, 626 n.2 (Minn. 1984) 
(Simonett, J., concurring specially). 
 9.  See, e.g., John E. Simonett, Dispelling the Products Liability Syndrome: 
Tentative Draft No. 2 of the Restatement (Third), 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 361 (1995).  
In the preface to his article he notes: 
The latest draft [of the Restatement (Third)] has four topics, thirteen 
sections with seventy-nine comments, plus detailed reporters’ notes.  
While much has happened, one is left with the impression that the law 
has come full circle.  Except for the manufacturing defect, products 
liability law now appears to be pretty much negligence tort law but with 
its own idiosyncratic features.  
Id. at 361.  He cuts to the quick in his analysis, the same as he did in his products 
liability opinions dealing with the problem of how to handle design defect cases.  
He provides guidance for trial judges and lawyers who have to deal with the 
problem of trying and submitting complicated products liability cases to juries. 
 10.  Kevin G. Ross, A Few Lessons from the Master Craftsman: Justice John Simonett 
the Writer, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 708, 714 (2013). 
 11.  In deference to and in honor of Justice Simonett, footnotes in this essay 




William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 11
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol39/iss3/11
  
800 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:3 
What follows is a brief discussion of his opinions covering nine 
sometimes-overlapping areas of tort and tort-related law.  The 
discussion highlights these characteristics. 
I. PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
The supreme court adopted strict liability in tort in 1967 in 
McCormack v. Hankscraft Co.,12 but in Holm v. Sponco Manufacturing, 
Inc.,13 the court was still in the process of working out the 
implications of the theory.  One of the problems concerned the 
relationship between overlapping theories of recovery of strict 
liability, breach of warranty, and negligence. 
In Holm, the supreme court jettisoned the latent-patent danger 
rule it had adopted six years earlier in Halvorson v. American Hoist 
and Derrick Co.14 as inconsistent with the policy justifications that 
originally prompted the adoption of strict liability theory in 
McCormack.  There was a second issue in Halvorson that created 
problems, the issue of an inconsistent verdict that occurred when 
the jury found that the defendant crane manufacturer was not 
strictly liable, but was negligent.  In Holm, which was factually 
similar, the supreme court allowed the plaintiff to proceed to trial 
on both his negligence and strict liability counts, which included 
design defect and failure to warn allegations.  That created the 
potential for the same inconsistent verdict that had occurred in 
Halvorson. 
 
A.B.A. J. 1141, 1141 (1969), begins with a reflection on the footnote addiction:  
Lawyers have a passion for documentation.  When counsel’s 
experienced eye first scans a legal manuscript, whether it be an appellate 
court’s opinion, a brief, memorandum or article, the presence or 
absence of footnotes immediately registers on the legal subconscious.  If 
the text flows on serenely for any distance without the ripple of at least a 
footnote or two, counsel knows, knows in his bones, before reading 
further, that the text is suspect. 
The article notes that excursionary footnotes are worthwhile.  Defining an 
“excursion” as “a short trip taken with the intention of returning to the point of 
departure; short journey for health or pleasure,” the article suggests that a good 
footnote should accomplish just exactly that.  Id.  The conclusion urges the use of 
the excursionary footnote: “In the sombre tomes of jurisprudence, and 
particularly there, midst the inundation of terms, concepts, doctrines, principles 
and premises that articulate the law, there should occasionally be respite, a 
footnote or two, some time taken for a short journey for pleasure or health.”  Id. at 
1143. 
 12.  278 Minn. 322, 337–40, 154 N.W.2d 488, 499–501 (1967). 
 13.  324 N.W.2d 207 (Minn. 1982). 
 14.  307 Minn. 48, 240 N.W.2d 303 (1976). 
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Justice Simonett agreed with the court’s opinion on the latent-
patent danger issue, but dissented from the court’s conclusion that 
the plaintiff should be permitted to advance to trial on both his 
negligence and strict liability theories.15  He noted the confusion in 
products liability law caused by the overlapping theories of strict 
liability, breach of warranty, and negligence theory, but, he wrote, 
“[w]hile fine distinctions can be made, these are often of little help 
to the trial bench that has to instruct the jury and to the jury that 
has to bring in a verdict.”16  He saw the case as essentially a 
negligence case: 
[T]he plaintiff was working on an aerial ladder in close 
proximity to an electric powerline.  He knew the 
powerline was there and he knew the dangers involved.  
Nevertheless, in maneuvering the ladder, he “made a 
mistake,” as his counsel put it, by “unconsciously exposing 
himself” to an obvious danger.  As a consequence, 
plaintiff’s arm (apparently not the ladder itself) came in 
contact with the powerline.  Plaintiff’s theory, really, is 
that the manufacturer could have protected him from his 
forgetfulness by doing more than affixing warning decals 
to the ladder, however adequate their message might be; 
the manufacturer should have equipped the ladder with 
insulation, sensors or other proximity warning devices 
which would have either warned plaintiff he was too close 
to the electric wires or prevented an electric current from 
passing through plaintiff to the ground.17 
The case involved negligence issues, including the issue of whether 
the manufacturer could reasonably have foreseen that its ladder 
would be used in proximity to power lines, but there was a 
corresponding duty on the plaintiff’s part to use reasonable care 
for his own safety.  The key point was that negligence law serves the 
same policy considerations as strict liability law.  Manufacturers are 
held accountable according to a theory that requires “weighing the 
likelihood and severity of the harm (electrocution) against the 
burden of adding safety devices more effective than warning decals 
(insulation or sensors).”18  He asked the question of why it was 
necessary to impose yet another theory on the case, “a strict liability 
 
 15.  Holm, 324 N.W.2d at 213–14 (Simonett, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 16.  Id. at 214. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. 
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theory that is really a carbon copy of the negligence action.”19  In 
his opinion, “[a]s a practical matter, where the strict liability claim 
is based on unsafe design or failure to warn, as is this case, there is 
essentially no difference between strict liability and negligence.”20 
Four years later, Justice Simonett’s views became the law in 
Bilotta v. Kelley Co.21  The majority accepted the effective merger of 
negligence and strict liability theory.  Justice Simonett, concurring 
specially in that case, explained his understanding of the 
differences: 
       In a design defect case, I do not think it can be said 
that either negligence or strict liability is “broader” than 
the other.  The most that can be said is that, depending 
on the facts of a particular case, the proof needed to 
survive a defendant’s motion for directed verdict may vary, 
so that one theory is “better” than the other for purposes 
of recovery.  In other words, the distinctions between 
strict liability and negligence may be important to the trial 
court in deciding whether the case goes to the jury, but 
once the case is submitted, insofar as the jury is 
concerned, any distinction between strict liability and 
negligence is nonexistent where the claim is for design 
defect or failure to warn.22 
Characteristically, he considered how a case would be 
submitted to a jury under a merged theory.  He agreed with the 
majority that a design defect case should be submitted under a 
single theory of products liability.  In his view, the instruction could 
be labeled either negligence or strict liability because the theory is 
“something of both.”23  He agreed with the majority that in design 
defect cases a reasonable care balancing approach was appropriate, 
and that the instruction could be labeled either negligence or strict 
liability.  In a footnote, he suggested how an instruction might be 
framed: 
       A product is unsafely designed if, by reason of its 
design, the product is in a defective condition 
unreasonably dangerous to the user.  The manufacturer 
has a duty to use due care to design a product that does 
not create an unreasonable risk of harm to anyone who is 
 
 19.  Id. at 214–15. 
 20.  Id. at 215. 
 21.  346 N.W.2d 616 (Minn. 1984). 
 22.  Id. at 625–26 (Simonett, J., concurring specially). 
 23.  Id. at 626. 
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likely to be exposed to the danger when the product is put 
to its intended use or to any unintended yet reasonably 
foreseeable use. 
       The reasonable care to be exercised by a 
manufacturer in the design of a product will depend on 
all the facts and circumstances, including, among others, 
a balancing of the likelihood of harm and the seriousness 
of that harm against the feasibility and burden of any 
precautions which would be effective to avoid the harm.24 
Of course, he noted that the proposed instruction was “only a 
suggestion,” and that “trial bench and bar is best situated to devise 
the appropriate instructions.”25 
In Kallio v. Ford Motor Co.,26 decided three years after Bilotta, 
the plaintiff was injured because of an alleged defect in the 
automatic transmission shifting mechanism of a Ford pickup truck.  
A jury found that the truck was defective.  Ford appealed, arguing 
that the trial court should have granted Ford’s motion for a 
directed verdict due to the lack of proof of a feasible alternative 
design or, in the alternative, that the trial court should have given 
Ford’s requested instruction relating to proof of a feasible 
alternative.  Justice Simonett, concurring specially, wrote to 
comment on additional evidence the plaintiff offered to establish a 
design defect.  The plaintiff’s expert previously testified in a 
different trial that the Ford transmission system was not 
unreasonably dangerous, but in the Kallio case he testified that he 
had invented a device that, although untested and possessing some 
bugs, and never installed in a vehicle, would, with substantial work, 
fix the problem.  The majority characterized the evidence as 
“weak,” but Justice Simonett thought the expert did not show that 
his alternative design was practical and that his testimony may not 
have withstood a motion to strike, had Ford made one.  He 
commented on the proof problems inherent in design defect cases 
on his way to stating his agreement with the outcome of the case, if 
not the majority’s rationale in getting there: 
       Conscious design defects present difficult problems of 
proof for both plaintiffs and manufacturers.  There is 
much room for second guessing, and courts are being 
asked to establish standards of reasonableness for 
 
 24.  Id. at 626 n.2.   
 25.  Id.  
 26.  407 N.W.2d 92 (Minn. 1987).    
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manufacturers (whether it be Ford or a fledgling family 
operation).  Establishing standards entails a weighing of 
engineering, marketing, and financing factors, which, at 
times, may be a difficult task for courts to perform.  On 
the other hand, the establishment of standards cannot 
always be avoided by passing the problem off to the jury 
under a general reasonable care instruction. 
       In any event, the limited issue before us is whether 
the trial court erred in refusing to give defendant’s 
requested instruction that plaintiff was required to prove 
the existence of a feasible, practical alternative design.  I 
agree with the majority opinion that the trial court’s 
instructions on burden of proof were adequate and that it 
was unnecessary to give the requested instruction which 
would have unduly singled out one aspect of the 
proof. . . . 
       Sometimes where proof is lacking for a conscious 
design defect, plaintiff may still be able to show breach of 
a duty to warn.  Here, plaintiff knew his pickup might 
move if the shift lever was not completely in the park 
position, and there was no need to warn on this 
elementary, obvious fact.  But what plaintiff did not know 
was that the shift lever would feel like it was in park when 
it was not.  The jury could have found there should have 
been a warning placed in the owner’s manual about this 
illusory effect.27 
Justice Simonett’s separate opinions in these three pivotal 
Minnesota products liability cases help to establish a base for design 
defect and, effectively, failure to warn cases.  His intuitive sense is 
that those cases are really negligence cases, a conclusion that other 
courts have reached and that is also the position taken in the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability.28  He also has an 
acute sense of the difficulties jurors may have in determining 
whether a manufacturer acted reasonably in designing a product, 
suggesting, perhaps, that trial courts will have to be gatekeepers in 
considering the complex balancing of factors involved in making 
the alternative design determination. 
These cases effectively settled arguments over distinctions 
between strict liability and negligence theories.  The basic 
principles have not been challenged since. 
 
 27.  Id. at 101 (Simonett, J., concurring specially) (citations omitted). 
 28.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (1998). 
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Two other cases involved the intersection of products liability 
law and the Uniform Commercial Code.  In Peterson v. Bendix Home 
Systems, Inc.,29 he established the template for the application of 
comparative fault principles to warranty claims in a straightforward 
opinion that logically precludes the application of comparative 
fault principles in cases involving direct and incidental damages 
that were unaffected by plaintiff fault. 
The plaintiff in the case bought a mobile home that was 
manufactured by Bendix from a local dealer.  Almost immediately 
after she moved in she began experiencing physical problems that 
were attributed in substantial part to the use of formaldehyde in 
the construction of the mobile home.  She brought suit against the 
dealer and manufacturer, alleging strict liability, negligence, and 
breach of express and implied warranties.  The trial court granted a 
directed verdict in favor of the dealer pursuant to Minnesota 
Statutes section 544.41 and in favor of the manufacturer on the 
negligence claim.  The jury found in favor of the defendant on the 
strict liability and express warranty claims but in favor of the 
plaintiff on the implied warranty of merchantability claim.  The 
jury was asked to compare “the combined fault that caused the 
damages.”30  It found that Bendix was only 25% at fault while the 
plaintiff, Peterson, was 75% at fault.  The jury found Peterson’s 
damages for the physical harm she suffered to be $5000, the 
difference in value between the mobile home as warranted and as 
delivered to be $15,000, and the incidental damages for installation 
and utility hookups to be $2500. 
Bendix argued that since implied warranty of merchantability 
sounds in tort, the plaintiff’s contributory negligence barred her 
recovery for all damages.  The opinion rejects the argument.  While 
holding that the plaintiff was barred from recovering for her 
consequential harm from Bendix because her fault was greater 
than Bendix’s, Justice Simonett explained that the plaintiff’s 
contributory negligence should not bar her claim for the direct 
and incidental damages.  He approached the issue from two 
different directions.  The first was application of the language of 
the Comparative Fault Act.  The Act says nothing about 
consequential damages, but the definition of “fault” in section 
604.01, subdivision 1(a), includes conduct that is “negligent or 
 
 29.  318 N.W.2d 50 (Minn. 1982). 
 30.  Id. at 52. 
10
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reckless toward the person or property” of another.31 
The definition of fault was based upon the Uniform 
Comparative Fault Act, however, and the comments to section 1 of 
that Act make it clear that comparative fault is not intended to 
cover actions “that are fully contractual in their gravamen and in 
which the plaintiff is suing solely because he did not recover what 
he contracted to receive.”32 
Then analyzing the warranty claim itself, the opinion reaches 
the same conclusion: 
Since the buyer did not design or make the defective 
product, the buyer cannot be legally responsible for the 
original defect.  Ordinarily, a buyer’s contributory fault in 
a warranty action will be some kind of product misuse or 
assumption of risk.  But while the buyer’s acts may bring 
on or avoid certain consequential harms from the product 
and thus bar recovery for such consequential harms, this 
conduct should not affect the buyer’s right to recover 
money paid for the defective goods.  The buyer is seeking 
a remedy for a bad bargain, a matter more like contract, 
not for consequential damages resulting from a bad 
product, a matter more like tort.33 
He continued to explore the relationship between tort and 
warranty claims in Lloyd F. Smith Co. v. Den-Tal-Ez, Inc.,34 a case 
involving a fire caused by a defective dental chair that also caused 
other property damage.  The plaintiffs included the dentist, the 
building owner, and other building tenants. 
The opinion first notes the difficulties involved in determining 
how tort and contract remedies relate to each other in defective 
product cases, which necessitates finding a principled basis for 
deciding when warranty applies and when negligence and strict 
liability apply.  The courts have said that the Code applies when the 
parties are sophisticated commercial entities or merchants, that a 
tort claim is appropriate if the product is unreasonably dangerous 
from a safety standpoint, and that a product failure that results in a 
sudden and calamitous occurrence indicates a tort claim.35 
 
 31.  MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subdiv. 1(a) (2010).  The definition of “fault” also 
includes breach of warranty. 
 32.  Peterson, 318 N.W.2d at 54 (quoting UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 1, 
cmt., 12 U.L.A. 35 (Supp. 1982)). 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  491 N.W.2d 11 (Minn. 1992). 
 35.  Id. at 11 (citing Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683, 688 (Minn. 
11
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He noted that while those individual tests may be helpful in 
deciding whether contract or warranty should apply in a given case, 
they are less helpful in determining whether, if both theories apply, 
one or the other is exclusive.  The problem is enhanced after the 
adoption of strict liability in tort because “[a]lthough strict liability 
is a tort, it is really a stripped-down model of a breach of warranty 
claim, with the result that the two remedies frequently overlap.”36  
The real issue in those cases “is whether allowing the tort remedy 
concurrent with breach of warranty would undermine the Uniform 
Commercial Code.”37  The overlap problem is complicated by the 
privity doctrine in sales law.  Warranty protection extends not only 
to subpurchasers but, under section 2-328 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, to “any person who may reasonably be expected 
to . . . be affected by the goods and who is injured by breach of the 
warranty.”38  In general terms: 
       As the Code’s warranty mantle extends out beyond 
the immediate sale, the less need there is to deny to those 
on the periphery of the sales transaction access to tort as 
well as contract remedies.  There is less likelihood, in such 
cases, of the U.C.C. being undermined by allowing 
concurrent tort remedies.  On the other hand, the closer 
the remedy comes to the very heart of the sales 
transaction, the more need there is to preserve the 
integrity of the Code.39 
Put another way: 
[I]f the buyer of a defective product is not a merchant 
dealing with another merchant in goods of the kind, the 
buyer is not precluded from suing in tort as well as 
contract for damage to his other property.  When the 
property damaged is not the property that was the subject 
of the sale, there is less reason, as between unequal 
contracting parties, to restrict the purchaser to his 
warranty remedies under sales law.  Such property losses 
can be substantial. . . .  But more importantly, allowing 
 
1990)); see also 80 S. Eighth St. Ltd. v. Carey-Can., Inc., 486 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 
1992) (adopting the dangerous from a safety standpoint rule); S.J. Groves & Sons 
Co. v. Aerospatiale Helicopter, 374 N.W.2d 431, 434–35 (Minn. 1985) (declining 
to adopt the “sudden and calamitous” distinction).  Justice Simonett was on the 
court for all of these cases. 
 36.  Lloyd F. Smith Co., 491 N.W.2d at 14. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  MINN. STAT. § 336.2-318 (2010). 
 39.  Lloyd F. Smith Co., 491 N.W.2d at 14−15. 
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tort liability in these cases does not undermine the Code’s 
primary role in regulating risk of loss of the defective 
product itself.40 
As applied, for the building owner and other tenants, as well as the 
dentist seeking recovery for property damage to property other 
than the dental chair, tort liability controlled, rather than the 
Uniform Commercial Code.41 
Peterson and Lloyd F. Smith Co. clarify the law governing cases in 
which plaintiffs have both tort and warranty claims involving 
defective products.  They provide a clear roadmap for determining 
which theory applies and what the defenses will be to each.42 
II. DUTY AND SPECIAL RELATIONSHIPS 
While one person ordinarily owes no duty to act for the 
protection of a third person, a duty may be imposed if there is a 
special relationship between the defendant and plaintiff or 
between the defendant and the person who causes the harm, and 
the harm is foreseeable.43  Stating the basic principle is simple, but 
the application is frequently not.  Application of the basic rules is 
heavily fact-dependent, of course, but policy considerations also 
play a key role in how broadly or narrowly the rules governing 
special relationships are applied. 
The two cases noted in this section indicate both problems.  In 
the first, Leaon v. Washington County,44 a Washington County Deputy 
Sheriff attended a stag party in which other men, apparently from 
the department, forced him to be the recipient of certain lewd 
action by a nude female dancer.  He brought suit against 
Washington County, the Green Acres Recreation site where the 
party was held, the county sheriff, the four party organizers, and 
John Doe defendants, alleging various intentional torts as well as 
torts based on negligence.  All claims were dismissed on the 
defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiff was 
denied permission to amend his complaint to state a claim for the 
negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
The last paragraph of the opinion effectively sets the stage for 
 
 40.  Id. at 15. 
 41.  Id. at 17. 
 42.  Two economic loss statutes, §§ 604.10, 604.101, also cover claims for 
economic loss. 
 43.  E.g., Lundgren v. Fultz, 354 N.W.2d 25, 27 (Minn. 1984). 
 44.  397 N.W.2d 867 (Minn. 1986). 
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a discussion of the special relationship issue: 
       One final comment.  The conduct at the party 
towards Donald Leaon was despicable.  Nor is the 
convenient “loss” of memory by law enforcement 
personnel attending the party edifying.  At the same time, 
as the trial court observed, Donald Leaon “had as much 
opportunity and certainly more reason to observe the 
culpable parties.”  Leaon has, however, been able to point 
to only [two of the individuals who held him down].  We 
concur with the trial judge’s concluding comment: “The 
court is unable and unwilling to transfer the liability of the 
unnamed wrongdoers to the individual defendants merely 
because of their presence at the party or to Washington 
County simply because it may have employed these 
persons who behaved with such mean contempt of human 
dignity on their off-duty hours.”45 
The court held that there was no duty on the part of the party 
organizers based on a special relationship: 
       Ordinarily a person owes no duty to control the 
conduct of another unless some special relationship 
exists.  Plaintiffs claim a duty arises here because the four 
defendants were deputy sheriffs, because they were the 
organizers of the stag party, and because, as “possessors of 
the land,” they had a duty to keep the premises reasonably 
safe.  Mere status as police officers does not, however, give 
rise to an affirmative duty to protect.  Neither does 
defendants’ status as organizers of the party create a 
special relationship between them and Leaon requiring 
them to exercise reasonable care to protect Leaon.  
Finally, a possessor of land may have a duty to protect, but 
this duty arises only if the possessor “(a) knows or has 
reason to know that he has the ability to control the third 
person, and (b) knows or should know of the necessity 
and opportunity for exercising such control.”  Ordinarily, 
this is a question of fact, but nothing in the record 
indicates that these two requirements for imposition of 
section 318 liability might exist.46 
Given the factual setting, it seems clear that the special 
relationship theory was a stretch, necessitated by the plaintiff’s 
unwillingness to name all the parties who actually forced him to 
 
 45.  Id. at 875. 
 46.  Id. at 873 (citations omitted). 
14
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 11
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol39/iss3/11
  
810 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:3 
engage in the conduct leading to the lawsuit. 
The special relationship issue has to be approached with 
caution, as Justice Simonett’s opinion in the second case, Erickson v. 
Curtis Investment Co.,47 indicates.  The case was more complicated 
from a policy standpoint.  The case arose out of a sexual assault of a 
parking ramp customer.  He held in that opinion that the ramp 
owner owed a duty to the customer. 
The court had previously considered the special relationship 
issue in a variety of contexts, including the duty of a business 
holding its premises open to the public to entrants on the 
premises,48 but because of the implications of a finding of duty, 
Justice Simonett proceeded cautiously, noting that “[a]s to business 
enterprises generally, the law has been cautious and reluctant to 
impose a duty to protect,” and that “[a] mere merchant-customer 
relationship is not enough to impose a duty on the merchant to 
protect his customers.”49 
The opinion highlights Justice Simonett’s reasons for the need 
for caution in cases involving the potential liability of a business for 
failure to provide appropriate security for its customers.  It echoes 
the concerns he expressed in his special concurrence two years 
earlier in Kallio v. Ford Motor Co.50 
Although Justice Simonett had great faith in the jury system, 
he was concerned that there would be a tendency in cases involving 
security issues for the focus to be not on the measures the 
defendant actually took, but whether additional security measures 
might have prevented the crime and that those additional security 
measures would ex post facto be the standard of care.  He also 
thought that the issue of whether the security precautions should 
have been taken requires some hindsight determination but that 
the tendency to invoke hindsight was exacerbated in cases involving 
failure to take security precautions. 
He also identified the cost-benefit equation as an additional 
policy consideration in the case.  Given the fact that society is 
presumably not risk-free, he observed, the question of whether 
security is adequate raises an issue as to what level of risk is 
acceptable for members of the public, which necessitates a cost-
 
 47.  447 N.W.2d 165, 168 (Minn. 1989). 
 48.  E.g., Gresser v. Taylor, 276 Minn. 440, 150 N.W.2d 869 (1967).  
 49.  Erickson, 447 N.W.2d at 168. 
 50.  407 N.W.2d 92, 101 (Minn. 1987) (Simonett, J., concurring specially).  
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benefit analysis.51  “In these cases,” he observed, “we recognize the 
jury may be deciding not so much a conflict in the facts as making 
an evaluative policy judgment.”52 
He concluded that some duty was owed by the defendant.  The 
decisive facts were: 
1. It was a large commercial parking ramp in a downtown 
metropolitan area. 
2. For a fee, several hundred cars were parked in the ramp. 
3. The interior had several levels, with support pillars, stairwells, 
and rows of unoccupied parked cars, which provided places of 
concealment, particularly if the interior was dimly lit. 
4. Anyone from the street could gain entrance to the ramp from 
the street. 
5. The ramp was relatively deserted.  People were present only 
momentarily,  either to park and leave or retrieve their cars. 
6. Unattended cars attracted thieves and vandals, and criminal 
activity involving property crimes was common.53 
The general characteristics of parking ramps prompted him to 
conclude that the opportunity for criminal activity is different from 
and greater than the risk presented on the street and in the 
neighborhood generally.54 
To ensure that the jury’s attention would be focused on the 
relevant factors governing the breach issue, Justice Simonett also 
stated that the defendant’s duty should be explained “along the 
following lines”: 
The operator or owner of a parking ramp facility has a 
duty to use reasonable care to deter criminal activity on its 
premises which may cause personal harm to customers.  
The care to be provided is that care which a reasonably 
 
 51.  Erickson, 447 N.W.2d at 168. 
 52.  Id. at 170.  In a following footnote he quoted Holmes: 
[E]very time that a judge declines to rule whether certain conduct is 
neglect or not, he avows his inability to state the law, and that the 
meaning of leaving nice questions to the jury is that while if a question is 
pretty clear we can decide it, as it is our duty to do, if it is difficult it can 
be decided better by twelve men at random from the street. 
Id. at 170 n.3 (alteration in original) (quoting OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., 
COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 234 (1920)).  Over time, jury verdicts on similar facts 
would, in Holmes’s opinion, enable a court to declare a specific standard of 
conduct, leaving the jury only with the issue of whether that standard of conduct 
was violated.  See George C. Christie, Judicial Review of Findings of Fact, 87 NW. U. L. 
REV. 14, 36 (1992). 
 53.  Erickson, 447 N.W.2d at 169. 
 54.  Id. 
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prudent operator or owner would provide under like 
circumstances.  Among the circumstances to be 
considered are the location and construction of the ramp, 
the practical feasibility and cost of various security 
measures, and the risk of personal harm to customers 
which the owner or operator knows, or in the exercise of 
due care should know, presents a reasonable likelihood of 
happening.  In this connection, the owner or operator is 
not an insurer or guarantor of the safety of its premises 
and cannot be expected to prevent all criminal activity.  
The fact that a criminal assault occurs on the premises, 
standing alone, is not evidence that the duty to deter 
criminal acts has been breached.55 
A cautious opinion, Erickson establishes a limited liability rule 
for business owners who are the subject of suits based upon 
negligent failure to provide adequate security for their customers.  
The conservative approach he counseled has defined subsequent 
cases involving failure to provide security by businesses.56  The 
opinion is equivocal about the role of the jury in these cases and, in 
light of those concerns, provides some detailed guidance as to how 
the duty issue should be explained to a jury. 
III. PREMISES LIABILITY 
In Bisher v. Homart Development Co.,57 the plaintiff was injured 
when she tripped on a large, visible planter in a shopping mall.  
The trial court submitted the case to a jury, which found the 
defendant liable and the plaintiff contributorily negligent.  The 
jury assigned fifty-seven percent of fault to the defendant and forty-
three percent to the plaintiff.  The trial judge granted defendant’s 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.58  On appellate 
review, the issue was whether there was any competent evidence 
reasonably tending to sustain the verdict. 
Justice Simonett, writing for the court, affirmed.  The case 
 
 55.  Id. at 169–70.  The factors are roughly similar to the risk-utility factors 
Justice Simonett suggested in his special concurring opinion in Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 
346 N.W.2d 616, 626 n.2 (Minn. 1984) (Simonett, J., concurring specially). 
 56.  See, e.g., Funchess v. Cecil Newman Corp., 632 N.W.2d 666, 674 (Minn. 
2001); Anders v. Trester, 562 N.W.2d 45, 47–48 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) 
(concluding fast food restaurant not liable for criminal assault of patron during 
late night bar rush); Errico v. Southland Corp., 509 N.W.2d 585, 587–89 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1993) (holding convenience store not liable for assault outside store).  
 57.  328 N.W.2d 731 (Minn. 1983). 
 58.  Id. at 733. 
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turned on the breach issue.  The opinion noted the relevant factors 
from Peterson v. Balach59 for resolving the breach issue, including 
the circumstances of the injured person’s entry; the foreseeability 
of harm; the defendant’s obligation to inspect, repair, or warn; the 
reasonableness of any inspection or repair; and the opportunity of 
correction or ease of repair.60  Then, the court noted the 
cautionary statement from Johnson v. Evanski61 that breach of duty 
has to be based upon “what should have been reasonably 
anticipated, not merely on what happened.”62  The landowner is 
not required to guard against all possible consequences, but only 
against those which should reasonably be anticipated “in the 
normal course of events.”63 
Applying those standards, the court held that there was no 
evidence establishing a breach of the defendant’s duty. 
The planter was in plain view, obvious in its presence, and 
had presented no problem for the heavy customer traffic 
that has existed since 1977, except for the one other 
accident that occurred after plaintiff’s.  To place warning 
signs at each corner of the multi-cornered planter would 
be ridiculous.  To add, say, another level of bricks to the 
3½-inch high border would have made no difference to 
plaintiff’s lookout and would not have prevented 
plaintiff’s fall.64 
It was the plaintiff’s obligation to establish that a different design 
would have made a difference.  Justice Simonett concluded that she 
did not make that showing.  The case is a faithful application of 
Peterson, in which the court held that a landowner owes a duty to 
use reasonable care for the protection of property entrants.  The 
emphasis is on breach rather than duty. 
In a second premises liability case, Wagner v. Thomas J. Obert 
Enterprises,65 the issue concerned the liability of a roller skating rink 
owner for injuries sustained by the fifty-seven-year-old plaintiff, who 
fell while leaving one of the exits to get to the lobby area.  There 
 
 59.  294 Minn. 161, 199 N.W.2d 639 (1972). 
 60.  Bisher, 328 N.W.2d at 733 (citing Peterson, 294 Minn. at 174 n.7, 199 
N.W.2d at 648 n.7). 
 61.  221 Minn. 323, 22 N.W.2d 213 (1946). 
 62.  Bisher, 328 N.W.2d at 733 (quoting Johnson, 221 Minn. at 326, 22 N.W.2d 
at 215). 
 63.  Id. (quoting Johnson, 221 Minn. at 326, 22 N.W.2d at 215). 
 64.  Id. at 734. 
 65.  396 N.W.2d 223 (Minn. 1986). 
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were two versions of the facts.  The plaintiff attempted to prove that 
she slipped on an improperly maintained threshold at the exit, but 
the defendant’s proof refuted that and attempted to establish that 
the plaintiff simply fell while trying to avoid a child while she was 
exiting the rink.  The governing legal principles turned on which 
version the jury accepted.  The jury found that the owner was not 
negligent but that the plaintiff was 100% negligent.  She appealed 
from the trial court’s denial of her post-trial motions for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial.  
The court of appeals reversed, holding that a new trial should be 
granted.66  One of the issues in the case was whether the trial court 
should have instructed the jury on primary assumption of risk. 
Distinguishing between primary and secondary assumption of 
risk has been problematic on a continuing basis in the Minnesota 
decisions.  The Wagner case is important because of the suggested 
limitations on the reach of primary assumption of risk.  The court 
noted that “[o]ne of the few instances where primary assumption 
of risk applies is in cases involving patrons of inherently dangerous 
sporting events.”67  It applies where the “parties have voluntarily 
entered a relationship in which plaintiff assumes well-known, 
incidental risks.”68  The defendant owes no duty to the plaintiff to 
protect the plaintiff from those incidental risks.  The court added, 
however, that primary assumption of risk does not operate to 
relieve the defendant of a duty to supervise the safety of skating 
activities or to maintain the premises in a safe condition.  
“Negligent maintenance and supervision of a skating rink are not 
inherent risks of the sport itself.”69 
Although the issue was not previously raised, Justice Simonett 
commented on the method of submitting primary and secondary 
assumption of risk to the jury, with the obvious intent of avoiding 
confusion in future cases.  The first special verdict question 
submitted to the jury asked, “Was the Defendant negligent on April 
12, 1982?”70  The jury was then instructed, “[I]f you find that the 
accident on April 12, 1982 arose from a risk inherent in the activity 
 
 66.  Wagner v. Thomas J. Obert Enters., 384 N.W.2d 477 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1986). 
 67.  Wagner, 396 N.W.2d at 226 (citing Springrose v. Willmore, 292 Minn. 23, 
24, 192 N.W.2d 826, 827 (1971)).  
 68.  Id. (quoting Olson v. Hansen, 299 Minn. 39, 44, 216 N.W.2d 124, 127 
(1974)). 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. at 227. 
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of skating and well-known to plaintiff Vera L. Wagner, then you 
must answer the question ‘No.’”71  The trial court also instructed 
the jury on the defendant’s general duty of reasonable care to keep 
its premises safe.  The effect was that the first question had to 
perform a double function.  If the jury found that the plaintiff’s fall 
was not due to an inherent skating risk, it could answer the 
question “no” if it also found that the defendant had used 
reasonable care in keeping its premises safe. 
He noted that the jury answered the question in the negative 
and that, under the evidence, could have done so.  The negative 
answer might have been supported either on primary assumption 
of risk grounds or on the basis that the defendant did not breach 
any duty to the plaintiff. 
Justice Simonett suggested an alternative means of submission 
in which the first question would ask whether the plaintiff assumed 
an inherent risk of roller skating in her accident.  If the jury 
answered yes, it would be told to go no further, but if it answered 
no, it would proceed to the remaining questions, beginning with a 
question asking whether the defendant was negligent.72  That would 
have separated the assumption of risk and liability issues into 
separate questions and would have provided greater clarity for the 
jury and in any post-trial review of the verdict. 
The most important aspect of the case is the statement that 
primary assumption of risk has limited application, primarily to 
cases involving inherently dangerous sporting events. 
IV. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
In Kinikin v. Heupel,73 a medical malpractice case, the supreme 
court in an opinion by Justice Simonett upheld a jury verdict for 
$600,000 against the defendant physician.  The plaintiff alleged 
both battery and failure to obtain informed consent.  The court 
upheld the jury verdict, holding that it was not error to give both 
instructions under the circumstances and that the informed 
consent instruction was properly framed. 
One of the issues in the case concerned the plaintiff’s 
awareness of the risks of the surgery the physician performed.  The 
opinion evaluated the impact of a patient’s awareness of a risk on 
 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  305 N.W.2d 589 (Minn. 1981).   
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an informed consent claim and then rejected it on the facts: 
       Concededly, a patient’s own medical expertise or 
prior treatments could reduce the amount of information 
needed from an attending physician to permit the patient 
to make an intelligent decision concerning surgery.  
Perhaps at times or in certain communities it is medical 
practice to assume from a patient’s medical history some 
medical expertise when explaining risks and alternate 
courses of treatment to him, although here the 
uncontroverted testimony of plaintiff’s expert was to the 
contrary.  In all situations, however, it is to the advantage 
of both the patient and his physician that the latter not 
presume too much upon the apparent experience or 
expertise of the former. 
       We do not mean by this that a physician may be liable 
for nondisclosure of a risk of which the patient had actual 
knowledge.  To win her case, plaintiff had to prove 
proximate cause, of which there are two elements: first, 
that had a reasonable person known of the risk he would 
not have consented to treatment; and, second, that the 
undisclosed risk materialized in harm.  If the physician 
could prove that the patient had actual knowledge of the 
risk which materialized, then his negligence would be 
immaterial and the patient’s case would fail.  Here, Dr. 
Heupel maintained that Mrs. Kinikin’s history of prior 
abdominal surgeries made her aware of the risk of skin 
necrosis presented by the breast surgery he performed 
and, hence, that any failure of disclosure on his part was 
not the proximate cause of her injuries.  Mrs. Kinikin 
disputed this and the jury resolved the issue in her favor.  
We see no error.74 
The opinion cautions against physicians making undue 
assumptions about a patient’s knowledge and experience for 
informed consent case purposes.  It is a reminder of the underlying 
basis for informed consent doctrine.  In light of that reminder, the 
court refused to hold as a matter of law that there was no duty to 




 74.  Id. at 595–96 (citation omitted). 
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V. GOVERNMENT LIABILITY 
Claims against governmental entities or government 
employees involve questions of substantive liability but also require 
consideration of immunities.  One of the issues in cases where a 
political subdivision fails to carry out its statutory obligations is 
whether recovery is barred based on the public duty exception the 
Minnesota Supreme Court adopted in Cracraft v. City of St. Louis 
Park.75  Cracraft set out a four-factor test for determining when a 
political subdivision owes a “special duty” to persons injured by the 
political subdivision’s negligence.  The factors include whether the 
subdivision had actual knowledge of the dangerous condition; 
whether there was reasonable reliance on specific representations 
of the subdivision; whether the statutory obligation was for the 
protection of a particular class; and whether the subdivision’s 
action increased the risk of harm.76  Stating the test is easier than 
applying it. 
Andrade v. Ellefson77 was a case involving a claim for negligence 
against day care providers and the county that licensed them.  
Considering whether a political subdivision owes a duty under 
Cracraft, Justice Simonett described the need for a limitation on the 
liability of a political subdivision: 
       The regulatory and licensing presence of the state 
and its political subdivisions in the affairs of the public is 
pervasive.  If there were blanket liability, it would be a rare 
lawsuit where some unit of government would not be 
sued.  If one accepts the premise, as we do, that not all 
government presence may impose potential tort liability 
on the government, then some test like Cracraft is needed 
to discern those instances where the state should be liable 
for not protecting against the acts of someone who injures 
someone else.  This is not a matter of sovereign immunity 
any more than a claim against [a next-door neighbor who 
complained about overcrowding at the day care center] 
would involve sovereign immunity.  As we said in Cracraft, 
there is no bright line, and each situation will require its 
own analysis.  The four Cracraft factors are helpful, 
however, and on occasion there may be other relevant 
factors as well.  We might add, too, as to the four Cracraft 
 
 75.  279 N.W.2d 801 (Minn. 1979). 
 76.  Id. at 806–07. 
 77.  391 N.W.2d 836 (Minn. 1986).     
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factors, that while they should all be considered, all four 
need not necessarily be met for a special duty to exist.78 
The third Cracraft factor was so “overwhelmingly dominant” that 
the court had “no difficulty in finding” that “a ‘special relation’ 
exists between the county and the small children in the day care 
homes that it inspects for licensure.”79  While the court in Cracraft 
stated that the factors did not lead to a bright-line analysis, Justice 
Simonett’s opinion emphasizes that the public duty exception is 
applied with some flexibility.  Cracraft is not a litmus test, and its 
factors are not exclusive. 
VI. MINN. STAT. § 347.22—THE DOG INJURY STATUTE 
In Lewellin v. Huber,80 the issue concerned the scope of liability 
under Minnesota Statutes section 347.22—the dog injury statute.  
The statute applies where a dog “attacks or injures” a person.  In 
Lewellin, a dog that was riding in a car distracted the driver, who 
lost control of her car and drove it into a ditch, hitting the 
plaintiff’s decedent.  While there was no question but that the 
dog’s actions were a cause-in-fact of the accident, the court 
concluded that the causal connection was too attenuated to justify 
making the dog owner liable for the death of the decedent.  While 
Justice Simonett noted that the statute is intended to impose 
absolute liability on the owner, the chain of causation may not be 
attenuated.  Without considering other potential scenarios, he 
concluded that “[i]t is enough to say here that legal causation for 
absolute liability under the statute must be direct and immediate, 
i.e., without intermediate linkage.”81 
He noted that section 347.22 is not the exclusive remedy in 
dog injury cases.  He noted that a common law negligence action is 
also potentially available in these cases and that the usual rules 
governing proximate cause apply to those claims.  In a negligence 
action, the defendant is liable for “all injuries naturally and 
proximately resulting from the negligence,” but he concluded that 
 
 78.  Id. at 841. 
 79.  Id. at 843.  While the county would have sovereign immunity, it was 
waived to the extent of the county’s liability insurance.  For the legislative 
responses to the problem, see id. at 843 n.7.  The supreme court followed Andrade 
in finding that the third factor was dominant in Radke v. County of Freeborn, 694 
N.W.2d 788, 798 (Minn. 2005) (finding the county liable under the Child Abuse 
Reporting Act). 
 80.  465 N.W.2d 62 (Minn. 1991). 
 81.  Id. at 65. 
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similarly elongating “the causal chain under the ‘dog bite’ statute 
would extend absolute liability beyond its intended purpose and 
reach.”82  He explained: 
       Courts have always used the tort doctrine of 
proximate cause, as distinguished from causation in fact, 
to implement public policy in establishing the parameters 
of liability.  Thus this court has frequently quoted 
Prosser’s statement that, “[a]s a practical matter, legal 
responsibility must be limited to those causes which are so 
close to the result, or of such significance as causes, that 
the law is justified in imposing liability.  This limitation is 
not a matter of causation, it is one of policy . . . .”  In 
applying our dog owner’s liability statute, public policy 
and legislative intent are best served by limiting proximate 
cause to direct and immediate results of the dog’s actions, 
whether hostile or nonhostile.83 
Questions concerning the scope of liability have been an 
ongoing problem in the interpretation of section 347.22.84  
Legislative intent and public policy caution against a broad 
application of the statute.  Justice Simonett’s approach to the 
problem is straightforward.  Liability under the statute has to be 
limited.  Basic proximate cause principles are the key to that 
limitation. 
VII. CIVIL DAMAGES ACT 
Justice Simonett wrote for the court in two cases involving the 
issue of what constitutes an illegal sale of alcohol under the Civil 
Damages Act.85  The first was Hollerich v. City of Good Thunder.86  
Hollerich involved an after-hours sale of alcohol and was, perhaps, a 
slightly easier case, at least insofar as determining whether an after-
hours sale is the sort of illegal sale contemplated by the Civil 
Damages Act.87  Rambaum v. Swisher88 is another example, but a 
 
 82.  Id.  
 83.  Id. at 65–66 (alterations in original) (citations omitted). 
 84.  Anderson v. Christopherson, 816 N.W.2d 626 (Minn. 2012), is the supreme 
court’s most recent foray into the scope of liability issue.  The court relied heavily 
on Lewellin in concluding that the injuries Anderson sustained in trying to separate 
his dog from the attacking dog were directly and immediately caused by the 
attacking dog. 
 85.  MINN. STAT. § 340A.801 (2010) 
 86.  340 N.W.2d 665 (Minn. 1983). 
 87.  Justice Simonett emphasized that finding that an after-hours sale is an 
“illegal sale” within the meaning of the Act solves only one of the requirements: 
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more difficult case. 
The issue in Rambaum was whether a sale of alcohol by a 
fraternal club to a driver who was neither a member nor guest was 
an “illegal sale” for purposes of liability under the Civil Damages 
Act.  Civil Damages Act cases require proof of an illegal sale, that 
the illegal sale caused intoxication of a person, and that the 
intoxication was a cause of injury to the intoxicated person or some 
third person.  The usual case involves a sale to an obviously 
intoxicated person, but there are other cases where illegal sales 
may be made, although connecting those violations to the purposes 
of the Civil Damages Act is less intuitive than in cases involving sales 
to obviously intoxicated persons.  Justice Simonett reasoned that 
the deeper history of the Act required broader consideration of the 
illegal sale issue: 
       If we were writing on a clean slate, the argument that 
dramshop liability should be limited to sales to obviously 
intoxicated persons would not be unattractive as a matter 
of logic.  In 1917, however, this court held that an illegal 
sale of liquor on Sunday was covered by the Dramshop 
Act.  In 1965, we added sales to minors, Kvanli v. Village of 
Watson . . . , and 5 years ago we added after-hours sales.  
We have looked to the manner in which certain kinds of 
illegal sales impact on the public’s access to and 
consumption of alcoholic beverages.  The legislature has 
not seen fit to disagree with our interpretations of the 
Civil Damages Act over the years.  In this case, with this 
background, we think it significant that the legislature has 
placed limits on the number of regular liquor licenses that 
a municipality may issue based on population.  See Minn. 
Stat. § 340A.413 (1986).  Club licenses, however, are 
excepted from this license quota, even though clubs, 
unlike some other special licensees, do substantial 
business.  The club exception is granted, however, with 
the proviso that sales must be limited to club members 
 
What must be remembered, however, is that more than an illegal sale is 
required for dramshop liability.  In addition, a claimant must, first, 
establish that the illegal sale contributed to the intoxication, and, second, 
that the intoxication contributed to cause the injury. As to the first 
causation issue, a scrutiny of all the surrounding circumstances must 
show “a practical and substantial relationship” between the illegal sale 
and intoxication. 
Id. at 668 (quoting Kvanli v. Vill. of Watson, 272 Minn. 481, 484, 139 N.W.2d 275, 
277 (1965)). 
 88.  435 N.W.2d 19 (Minn. 1989). 
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and guests.  This proviso serves, we think, to limit the 
extent clubs can compete for business with other licensed 
vendors, thereby reducing the potential for alcohol abuse 
that occurs with competition for consumers in an over-
saturated market.89 
Because of the legislature’s strict regulation of alcohol vendors 
and its deep concern over the problem of alcohol abuse, the court 
held that the relationship between the restrictive club license and 
the purposes of the Civil Damages Act was sufficiently substantial to 
make a club sale to a nonmember an illegal sale.  The result was 
justified by a careful consideration of precedent interpreting a 
statute with a long history.  Absent that history, Justice Simonett 
likely would have reached a different result. 
VIII. COMPARATIVE FAULT 
In Hudson v. Snyder Body, Inc.,90 Hudson was injured when the 
box of a dump truck dropped on his shoulder.  He and his wife 
brought suit in negligence and strict liability against the 
manufacturer of the hoist that raised the box of the truck 
(Perfection), the dealer that supplied the chassis on which the box 
was mounted (Potomac), and the company that assembled the 
truck (Snyder).  The assembler brought a third-party claim for 
contribution and indemnity against the plaintiff’s employer 
(Olsen).  The jury found for the plaintiff.  It found each defendant 
liable on the negligence and strict liability theories and assigned 






The defendants appealed.  The supreme court affirmed in part and 
reversed in part.  The court held that the evidence did not support 
any finding of negligence on the part of the chassis dealer, 
Potomac, and that Potomac, which simply passed on a product, was 
not the cause of the defect.  The court also held that Olsen, the 
employer, could be held liable on the contribution claim by the 
defendants, even though the plaintiff’s fault was equal to Olsen’s 
 
 89.  Id. at 21–22 (citations omitted). 
 90.  326 N.W.2d 149 (Minn. 1982). 
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and Olsen, had it been a defendant, could not have been held 
liable to the plaintiff (the comparative negligence statute, at the 
time, barred from recovery a plaintiff whose fault was equal to or 
greater than the fault of the defendant). 
Justice Simonett concurred in part and dissented in part.  He 
dissented from the majority’s conclusion that Olsen, the employer, 
could be held liable on a contribution claim by the defendants.  
Even though workers’ compensation was the exclusive remedy of 
the plaintiff and the employer could not have been held liable in a 
direct suit by its employee, Justice Simonett thought that irrelevant, 
given the right of third parties to obtain contribution from 
employers,91 but he would not have created a pure comparative 
fault exception to the Comparative Fault Act.92 
In analyzing the liability of the dealer, Potomac, he thought 
that the jury’s findings, that Potomac sold a defective unit yet was 
zero percent at fault, were not inconsistent.  He concluded that it 
meant only that Potomac sold a defective product but was not 
responsible for the defect.  He understood the majority opinion to 
mean that Potomac was liable, “but only in a vicarious or derivative 
sense as the inert seller in the marketing chain.”93  He observed 
that “[t]his is not the kind of conduct that needs to be included in 
a comparative fault question, and the jury properly ignored it.  
Potomac should be found liable to plaintiffs but entitled to 
indemnity from the other defendants . . . .”94 
Justice Simonett’s analysis becomes important in cases where a 
party lower in the chain of manufacture and distribution sold a 
defective product but is not assigned a percentage of fault.95  It 
helps to clarify the majority opinion and provides critical guidance 
in determining how the fault of multiple parties should be 
submitted to a jury where the fault of one or more parties is 
 
 91.  See Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., 312 Minn. 114, 257 N.W.2d 679 
(1977). 
 92.  Hudson, 326 N.W.2d at 159 (Simmonett, J., concurring specially). 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id.  
 95.  The seller’s exception statute, MINN. STAT. § 544.41 (2010), enacted in 
1980 but not applicable to the case, allows a seller lower in the chain to avoid strict 
liability where the manufacturer is solvent and subject to jurisdiction in 
Minnesota, but there may be cases where the manufacturer’s fault is submitted on 
a special verdict form and the manufacturer’s fault is set at 100% but the 
manufacturer is bankrupt.  A retailer found to have sold the defective product is 
nonetheless liable for 100% of the damages.  See Marcon v. Kmart Corp., 573 
N.W.2d 728 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998). 
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vicarious or derivative. 
In Cambern v. Sioux Tools, Inc.,96 an important case interpreting 
the Comparative Fault Act, the plaintiff was injured in the course of 
her employment with Bayliner Boats when a drill handle slipped 
and twisted, causing her serious injuries.  The plaintiff brought suit 
against the manufacturer of the drill, Sioux Tools.  The jury found 
the plaintiff 35% at fault, Sioux Tools 20% at fault, and Bayliner 
Boats 45% at fault.  The issue was whether the plaintiff was entitled 
to recover against Sioux Tools, even though her fault was greater 
than Sioux Tools’s. 
Justice Simonett, writing for the court, held that she could not.  
The plaintiff argued that the fault of the defendants should be 
aggregated in cases such as this, where the fault of the defendants 
overlapped.  He rejected the argument.  Minnesota precedent is 
clear.  Absent proof of an economic joint venture, there is no 
aggregation of fault.  The overlapping duty argument would 
expand that precedent and present a jury with a “nearly impossible 
task” of sorting out what portions of fault overlap.97  Furthermore, 
there was no joint duty in the case.  Bayliner and Sioux Tools were 
simply concurrently negligent.98 
One cannot help but wonder whether the opinion was also 
influenced by Delgado v. Lohmar,99 a 1979 case in which a farm 
owner was blinded by a shot fired by one of the members of a 
grouse hunting party.  Justice Simonett, in private practice, 
represented one of the members of the hunting party who had not 
fired the shot.  In a joint brief, the respondents argued that liability 
should not be imposed on the other members of the hunting party 
under a joint enterprise liability theory.  While I do not know 
whether Justice Simonett wrote the following part of the brief, the 
style and mode of argument certainly sound like his.  If he did not 
author that part of the brief, he must have influenced it: 
       Prosser, in his fourth edition, has an excellent 
discussion of joint enterprise.  He points out how it rests 
on an analogy to the law of partnership, but that “except 
in comparatively rare instances,” its application outside 
commercial transactions has been in the field of 
automobile negligence.  Prosser does not believe joint 
 
 96.  323 N.W.2d 795 (Minn. 1982). 
 97.  Id. at 798.  
 98.  Id. at 799. 
 99.  289 N.W.2d 479 (Minn. 1979).    
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enterprise should apply to situations of friendly 
cooperation and accommodation, “where there is not the 
same reason for placing all risks upon the enterprise 
itself,” as there is in the case of a business venture.  
Moreover, to say here the parties on a hunting trip 
entered into a contractual relationship and to say, further, 
that each member shared a “right of control” over the 
others, and, then, to say further, that each hunter was the 
agent or servant of the others, is to pile here fictions on 
top of each other.  “This top heavy structure,” says Prosser, 
referring to the three fictions, “tends to fall of its own 
weight.”  Prosser, Torts, (4th ed.), pp. 475–481. 
       Moreover, the policy implications of plaintiffs’ theory 
are alarming.  Every Minnesota hunter—no matter if he 
or she is not at fault, for that is irrelevant—becomes liable 
for the fault of anyone else in the group.  And if 
negligence can be imputed to persons hunting, 
presumably it can be imputed to persons playing golf 
together or baseball or whatever.  This is not, and should 
not be, the law.100 
In Rambaum v. Swisher,101 the court considered the relationship 
between a Pierringer release and the Comparative Fault Act.  The 
plaintiff’s post-collateral-source discount damages totaled 
$268,241.67.  The jury assigned 10% of the fault in the case to a 
fraternal organization where the plaintiff was illegally served 
alcohol, 10% to another bar where the plaintiff drank, and 80% to 
Swisher, the driver of the car that hit the plaintiff.  The plaintiff 
settled with the other bar for $200,000.  The remaining defendants 
argued that the full amount of the settlement should be deducted 
from the damages.  The fair share of the remaining bar, the 
Croatian Club, would have been 10% of the damages, or 
$26,924.17.  The plaintiff arguably would receive a windfall if 
permitted to recover the damages against the remaining 
defendants with no deduction for the settlement.  The 
Comparative Fault Act seemed to anticipate this in subdivision 5 of 
section 604.01: 
       All settlements and payments made under 
subdivisions 2 and 3 shall be credited against any final 
settlement or judgment; provided however that in the 
 
 100.  Respondents’ Brief at 17−18, Delgado v. Lohmar, 289 N.W.2d 479 (Minn. 
1979) (No. 49636). 
 101.  435 N.W.2d 19 (Minn. 1989). 
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event that judgment is entered against the person seeking 
recovery or if a verdict is rendered for an amount less 
than the total of any such advance payments in favor of 
the recipient thereof, such person shall not be required to 
refund any portion of such advance payments voluntarily 
made.  Upon motion to the court in the absence of a jury 
and upon proper proof thereof, prior to entry of 
judgment on a verdict, the court shall first apply the 
provisions of subdivision 1 and then shall reduce the 
amount of the damages so determined by the amount of 
the payments previously made to or on behalf of the 
person entitled to such damages.102 
The defendant fraternal organization argued that if the settlement 
exceeded the settling defendant’s fair share, the amount by which 
the settlement exceeded the settling defendant’s fair share should 
be credited against the plaintiff’s award.  Justice Simonett rejected 
that argument.  Applying the Pierringer payment in full against the 
entire award would be contrary to the intent of the parties to the 
settlement, “who agreed to deduct from the verdict award only that 
portion of the settlement payment attributable to the fault of the 
settling defendant.”103  It would also seriously impair the utility of 
the Pierringer release. 
Justice Simonett noted that subdivision 5 of the Comparative 
Fault Act was enacted in 1969, before the Pierringer release was 
recognized by the supreme court,104 and that the legislature did not 
appear to have Pierringer releases in mind when it adopted 
subdivision 5.105  Allowing an overall pro tanto reduction of the 
plaintiff’s damages would effectively dismantle the Pierringer 
release, he concluded, and the nonsettling defendants would 
obtain a “windfall” and provide it with a further reason for not 
considering settlement.106  Of necessity, subdivision 5 had to be 
ignored. 
 
 102.  MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subdiv. 5 (2010). 
 103.  Rambaum, 435 N.W.2d at 22–23. 
 104.  The supreme court recognized the Pierringer release in Frey v. Snelgrove, 
269 N.W.2d 918, 922 (Minn. 1978).  Of course, Justice Simonett wrote the 
definitive article on Pierringer releases in Minnesota when he was in practice.  See 
John E. Simonett, Release of Joint Tortfeasors: Use of the Pierringer Release in 
Minnesota, 3 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1 (1977). 
 105.  Rambaum, 435 N.W.2d at 23. 
 106.  Id. 
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IX. FRAUD AND MISREPRESENTATION 
Florenzano v. Olson107 was a fraudulent misrepresentation case 
brought against an insurance agent based upon false 
representations that induced the insured to withdraw from 
participation in the social security program.  The case is 
complicated because of the various forms a misrepresentation 
claim may take.  Justice Simonett concurred specially: 
       The majority opinion, as I read it, holds that (1) 
comparative negligence does not apply to an intentional 
tort; (2) plaintiffs failed to prove intentional fraud as a 
matter of law; and (3) while negligent misrepresentation 
was proven, comparative negligence applies, and the jury’s 
verdict putting 62.5% negligence on plaintiff precludes 
plaintiffs’ recovery.  I join in the result reached by the 
majority and in its essential holdings, but because the 
subject is important, with consequences yet to be seen, 
and because my approach differs in some respects, I take 
this occasion to write.  The majority opinion, prudently, 
leaves to another day a further formulation of the concept 
of intentional misrepresentation.  Yet, it seems to me, that 
formulation is very much implicated here and it might be 
useful to say something more, if not to provide a solution, 
at least to point out where the problems lie.108 
The concurrence goes on to further clarify.  The court accepted 
the proposition that comparative negligence is inapplicable to 
claims involving intentional torts, raising the issue of when a 
fraudulent misrepresentation is intentional.  Intent to deceive is a 
clear case.  He reads the majority opinion to say that a defendant 
asserting a fact as of his own knowledge without knowing if it is true 
or false would also constitute an intentional tort.  In discussing 
fraud claims, he wrote: 
       It seems to me that under the broad category of fraud 
we have three types of actionable misrepresentations: the 
first is deceit; the second, for want of a better name, I will 
call reckless misrepresentation; and the third is negligent 
misrepresentation.  The first two types have always been 
combined under the Davis v. Re-Trac109 formulation, but 
now, because of the enactment of Minn. Stat. § 604.01 
 
 107.  387 N.W.2d 168 (Minn. 1986). 
 108.  Id. at 176–77 (Simonett, J., concurring specially). 
 109.  Davis v. Re-Trac Mfg. Corp., 276 Minn. 116, 149 N.W.2d 37 (1967) 
(footnote added by author). 
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and today’s holding, they must be separated at least for 
the purpose of determining whether comparative 
negligence or fault applies.110 
The concurrence takes the position that comparative responsibility 
applies to reckless and negligent misrepresentations but not to 
deceit claims.  “The dividing line is the ‘intent to deceive’ which 
distinguishes deceit from the other two torts and which makes 
deceit a true, not a fictional, intentional tort.”111 
The majority opinion suggested that, where a case is submitted 
to the jury on intentional and negligent misrepresentation claims, 
there should be separate interrogatories on the intent element 
asking, first, whether the defendant knew the facts to be false and, 
if not, whether the defendant asserted the facts as of his or her own 
knowledge without knowing if they were true or false.  Justice 
Simonett clarified that approach by suggesting an alternative that 
focused on the representation, as well as what the impact of the 
findings would be on the application of comparative negligence 
principles: 
       In future cases where both deceit and reckless 
misrepresentation are submitted to the jury, I assume the 
trial court, in submitting the 11 elements of 
misrepresentation . . . , may wish to separate the element 
of “fraudulent intent” into two questions, namely: (1) Did 
defendant know the representation to be false? and, if 
not, then (2) Did defendant assert the representation as 
of his own knowledge without knowing whether it was true 
or false?  Only if the second question is answered yes 
would comparative negligence apply.112 
Here, as elsewhere, he writes separately, just to clarify a few things.  
He makes suggestions that will avoid further confusion, and he 
makes a suggestion as to how claims involving intentional and 
negligent misrepresentations can be submitted to a jury to achieve 
a clear resolution of the separate claims, as well as providing a clear 




 110.  Florenzano, 387 N.W.2d at 177 (footnotes omitted). 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. at 179 (citations omitted). 
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X. CONCLUSION 
A discussion of these nine areas of tort and tort-related law 
cannot do full justice to the talents of the Justice in structuring and 
applying the law of torts.  The strength of his approach to crafting 
his opinions, a more descriptive word than writing, is his 
consistency in striving to simplify the law and to apply the rules 
fairly.  While Holmes may have said that his job was not to do 
justice but to apply the rules,113 Justice Simonett most certainly did 
both.  He decided cases, of course, but he taught the law so that 
judges, lawyers, and juries could do justice in applying it. 
 
 
 113.  See Michael Herz, “Do Justice!” Variations of a Thrice-Told Tale, 82 VA. L. 
REV. 111, 111 (1996).  Justice Simonett quoted Holmes in The Use of the Term 
“Result-Oriented” to Characterize Appellate Decisions.  Simonett, supra note 2, at 201. 
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